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the very product of that cooperative effort.5"
There are still some difficult problems remaining. First, as the
Second District noted, there remains clear Florida precedent in support of applying the governmental/proprietary use test to determine
whether a governmental unit can ignore its own zoning ordinance.5
Although beyond the scope of the holding in the noted case, the
Temple Terrace courts' criticism of the governmental/proprietary
use test" and the passage of the Planning Act, 3 seem to undercut
the authority of this precedent.
There also remains the problem of land use control in our federal system of government, and the amount of deference which federal and state governments should grant to each other." This, of
course, is clearly beyond the scope of this note. Nonetheless, it
looms as an important problem in the not too distant future.
These, and perhaps other problems in the area of governmental
immunity will remain; however, the decision rendered by the Second District and adopted by the supreme court in Temple Terrace
presents a reasoned analysis for resolution of the problems.
JOSEPH M. MATTHEWS

Lease of Bay Bottom Land Does Not Constitute
State Action
Responding to allegationsof discriminatorymembership policies
violative of the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause,
the court in Golden held that the leasing of bay bottom land by
the City of Miami to a private club did not constitute state ac50. It should be noted that the Planning Act contains the standard clause: Nothing in
this act is intended to withdraw or diminish any legal powers or responsibilities of state
agencies or change any requirements of existing law that local regulations comply with state
standards or rules. FLA. STAT. § 163.3211 (1975). However, this does not diminish the force of
the clear legislative intent that the state cooperate with local governments to achieve the most
effective land use program possible.
51. Nichols Eng'r & Research Corp. v. State ex rel. Knight, 59 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1952);
ALA Mobile Home Park, Inc. v. Brevard County, 246 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
52. See text accompanying notes 29-31, supra.

53. See note 48 supra, particularly FLA.

STAT.

§ 163.3194(1) (1975).

54. See e.g., Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park and Planning Comm'n v. United States Postal
Serv., 487 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1973), noted in 10 WIL. L.J. 477 (1974) (reviewing court should
particularly scrutinize a federal agency decision not tofile an environmental impact statement when such action results in a deviation from local zoning procedures).
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tion. In so doing, the court decided that the degree of state involvement necessary to constitute state action is the same
whether racial discriminationor some other violation of the fourteenth amendment is alleged. This note comments on the decision in light of United States Supreme Court precedent and
decisions of other circuits and suggests that this case raises issues
requiringresolution on a national level.
Plaintiffs Harold S. Golden and David Fincher, a Jew and a

Black, expressed to officials of the private Biscayne Bay Yacht
Club an interest in obtaining applications for membership. They
were informed that in order to be eligible for membership it was
necessary to be sponsored by a member.' Plaintiffs then brought
suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.' They asserted

that the club's admission policies were discriminatory on the basis
of race and religion and therefore violated the fourteenth amendment and civil rights statutes.' The district court found that the
1. The district court found that plaintiff Golden had sent a letter to the commodore of
requesting an application for membership, and was informed
that membership was by sponsorship only. On January 14, 1972, plaintiff Fincher expressed
his interest in joining the club but was similarly advised. No proposal for membership was
ever submitted on behalf of either plaintiff. Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 370 F. Supp.
1038, 1041 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
The by-laws of the club provided for invitation to membership by three sponsors, consisting of a proposer and two seconders who would file letters with the club secretary stating the
candidate's qualifications. These letters would be accompanied by the candidate's application form, prepared by one of the sponsors. Members would then be given an opportunity to
express their opinions of the candidate to the membership committee. After "due investigation," the Board of Governors, sitting as the membership committee, would vote by secret
ballot. At least eight members would be needed for a quorum, and if any three vetoed the
application no invitation would issue. For the pertinent by-laws in their entirety, see the
noted case, Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 530 F.2d 16, 24 n.4 (5th Cir. 1976) (Brown,
C.J., dissenting).
2. The club argued, in the district court, that since plaintiffs had never been proposed
for membership they suffered no injury and, therefore, could not contest the club's membership policies. The district court held, however, that after plaintiffs expressed an interest in
joining the club, being told that there was nothing they could do without a recommendation
served as a sufficient rejection to give them standing to challenge the club's membership
policies. 370 F. Supp. at 1042. The three-judge panel which heard the case affirmed on this
point. Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 521 F.2d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 1975). The en banc
majority, while expressing doubt as to plaintiff's standing "concluded, however, not to allow
this point to decide the disposition of the appeal." Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 530
F.2d 16, 23 (5th Cir. 1976).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 (Equal rights under the law), 1983 (Civil action for deprivation of
rights), and 2000(a) (Prohibition against discrimination or segregation in places of public
accommodation) (1970).

the club on February 18, 1969,
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club's membership policy was discriminatory in operation and effect 4 and that it was conducted "under color of law" because the
club's docking facilities were located on bay bottom land leased
from the city of Miami for an annual fee of one dollar.' The district
court ordered the club to discontinue its discriminatory policies.'
The club appealed, asserting, inter alia, that its actions were not
under "color of law." 7 A three-judge panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, one judge dissentThe relevant portion of the fourteenth amendment provides: "No state shall ...
deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
4. In holding that the club's membership policies were discriminatory, the district court
noted that even though the total population of Dade County was 1,267,792, including 187,500
Jewish persons and 189,666 Blacks, the club had never had a Jewish or Black member (with
the exception of one honorary Black member) in 86 years of operation. While the club's bylaws contained no exclusionary provisions, the court held that "when membership in an
established private club is solely by internal sponsorship and no member has ever been
selected out of the large challenging group, then the membership policies of the organization
are suspect." The court then concluded that plaintiffs had not been afforded the same rights
as their White and Christian counterparts. 370 F. Supp. at 1043.
5. Id. at 1042.
6. Id. at 1044. The district court granted relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) which
states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970) gives the district courts original jurisdiction of civil actions brought
under section 1983:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized
by law to be commenced by any person . . .(3) To redress the deprivation, under
color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any
right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or
by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons
within the jurisdiction of the United States . ...
Two elements must be proved in order for a plaintiff to recover under section 1983. First,
plaintiff must prove that defendant has deprived him of a right secured by the "Constitution
and laws" of the United States. Second, plaintiff must prove that defendant acted "under
color of law." Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970). In cases based on 42
U.S.C. § 1983, the "under color of law" requirement has been equated with the "state action';
required by the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794
n.7 (1966).
7. The club also asserted that plaintiffs lacked standing, and that the record failed to
support the conclusions of the trial court that the plaintiffs were deprived of their
constitutional rights and that the club's membership policies were discriminatory on the basis
of race and religion. Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 521 F.2d 344, 347 (5th Cir. 1975).
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ing.5 After rehearing en banc, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit held, reversed: The lease of bay bottom land
to the club did not supply the requisite significant state action in
the club's membership policies to invoke the fourteenth amendment
and grant relief under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.1 Golden v. Biscayne
Bay Yacht Club, 530 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1976).
The problem presented to the court in Golden is whether the
state has become sufficiently involved in the actions of a seemingly
private entity to require application of the proscriptions of the fourteenth amendment. Inquiry into the existence of state involvement

is necessary because of the construction that has been given to the
fourteenth amendment since the Civil Rights Cases.'"As stated by
Chief Justice Vinson in Shelley v. Kraemer: "[Tihe action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such
action as may fairly be said to be that of the states. That Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful."" The United States Supreme Court has
never stated a hard and fast rule which may be applied in all situations to determine if the requisite state involvement is present. 2
However, the Court has indicated that merely because a private
entity receives any benefits or services from the state does not mean
that discrimination by that entity violates the fourteenth amendment. 3 Therefore, the appropriate inquiry is not merely into the
existence of state involvement but also must encompass the nature
8. 521 F.2d 344. For a complete discussion of the panel decision see 54 TEX. L. REV. 641
(1976).
9. The en banc reversal of the panel decision was based entirely on its conclusion that
the requisite state action was not present and therefore an action could not be maintained
under section 1983. The panel, having found relief appropriate under section 1983, had not
reached the questions of whether or not an action could be maintained under 42 U.S.C. §
1981 or 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (1970). These questions were not, therefore, confronted by the
court en banc. Also, the court referred only briefly to the other points raised by appellant
before the panel. 530 F.2d at 23. See notes 2 and 7 supra. It might further be pointed out
that while continuing to rely on its position with regard to all issues raised before the panel,
for purposes of the rehearing en banc appellant's brief was "primarily directed to the color of
law question." Brief for Appellant at 3 (emphasis in original).
10. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
11. 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
12. In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), the Court indicated that a case-by-case analysis would be necessary to determine whether the extent of
state involvement required the application of fourteenth amendment restraints in particular
situations. "Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance." Id. at 722.
13. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972).
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and extent of state involvement in the private activity. In the context of the equal protection clause, it is only where the state has
"significantly involved itself with invidious discriminations" that
the restrictions of the fourteenth amendment apply."
However, in determining whether the state's involvement in
private activity is significant, it has been suggested that it is not
sufficient merely to examine the nature and extent of the state's
involvement with the private entity in question.' 5 In situations
where the action challenged is neither purely private conduct nor
solely state action a court may be called on to "decide when and
which private rights are subject to constitutional limitations because of government involvement."'" Thus, it has been suggested
that courts must also consider the nature of the private rights asserted by the parties in determining whether or not state action is

present. 7 Using this approach, which focuses on the nature of the

right asserted and the conduct challenged as well as on the extent
of state involvement, some courts have employed a less exacting
standard in determining if the requisite state action is present in
cases where the plaintiff alleges racial discrimination than in cases
involving alleged violations of other constitutional rights.' 8 Furthermore, when this "balancing of interests" approach is employed, the
14. Id., quoting Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967). The "significantinvolvement" test has been further defined and indices of significant state involvement have
been extrapolated from the case law. These include the quantum of state contacts with the
private entity, and whether the state contacts confer a benefit on the private entity which
tend to perpetuate the discriminatory activity. Note, Developing Legal Vistas for the Discouragement of Private Club Discrimination, 58 IowA L. REv. 109, 115 (1972).
In addition to the significant involvement theory of state action, other theories have also
been developed. These include the "public-function" principle, which is premised on the
theory that if a private entity engages in activities of a public nature, such entity must
conform to the standards of conduct prescribed by the fourteenth amendment; and the
"minimal involvement" theory which differs from the significant involvement theory essentially in degree and has not been widely applied by the courts. Id. at 112-13. For a similar
discussion of state action theories see Note, Constitutional Law-Private Club
Discrimination, 1970 Wis. L. REV. 595, 597-99. For further discussion of state action theories
in the context of the instant case see notes 35 and 54 infra.
15. Note, State Action and the Burger Court, 60 VA. L. REV. 840, 841 (1974).
16. Id.
17. Id.; see Weise v. Syracuse University, 522 F.2d 397, 405 (2d Cir. 1975) (nature of right
infringed as well as the extent of state involvement should be considered in determining if
state action is present); Pitts v. Department of Revenue, 333 F. Supp. 662, 669 (E.D. Wis.
1971) (court cannot decide in the abstract whether state action is sufficient to impregnate
private conduct with governmental character-court must examine that conduct both in light
of the right allegedly violated and in light of the right under which it is asserted to be proper).
18. See cases cited note 55 infra.
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state action determination may serve as a mechanism by which a
court can give priority to one right or interest over another. This is
because a finding of no state action may deny a federal court the
jurisdiction to hear the case, thus preserving the status quo.'
Golden is an interesting case for several reasons. First, the
court's decision was made in the absence of any clearly controlling
decision by the United States Supreme Court on the issue of
whether a lease of public property to an otherwise private club
constitutes state action for fourteenth amendment purposes."
Second, the Fifth Circuit, in Golden, has apparently rejected the
proposition that a less exacting standard for the determination of
state action should be employed in cases involving racial discrimination. Finally, the case illustrates that the state action decision
may decide, in effect, which of several conflicting and important
interests are to be afforded constitutional protection.
In Golden, the sole link between the City of Miami and the
private yacht club was the lease involving city bay bottom land
upon which the club's docking facilities stood. The city had been
deeded the bay bottom land in 1949 by the Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Fund of the State of Florida under terms which required that the land be used for public purposes." In 1962 the city
had asserted ownership to the land and since that time had rented
it to the club at the annual rate of one dollar. The club, however,
had utilized the land for some 30 years prior to 1962. In 1969, the
city obtained a waiver for its lease to the club by asserting that the
docks maintained by the club helped relieve the city's shortage of
dock facilities." Also, the City of Miami had enacted ordinances
dealing with the rental of city-owned property which prohibited
discrimination on the basis of race, religion, color, or natural origin,
and further prohibited sponsorship requirements for membership
when the lessee was a private club. 3 On these facts the three-judge
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970) gives federal district courts jurisdiction to hear civil
actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) to redress the deprivation of rights "under color
of any State law ....
" See note 6 supra.
20. The district court found that the club met the test of being a private club and was
not formed as a subterfuge to evade civil rights laws. 370 F. Supp at 1041.
21. Id. at 1040. The deed restrictions are quoted at some length by Chief Judge Brown
in his dissent in the noted case. 530 F.2d at 25 n.7.
22. 370 F. Supp. at 1040. The waiver was necessary because of the requirement that the
land be used solely for public purposes.
23. Id. at 1040-41. The ordinances are also quoted at length in Chief Judge Brown's
dissent in the noted case. 530 F.2d at 27 n.10.
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panel had found the lease to be "essential to the club's function"
and therefore sufficient state action to require compliance with the
fourteenth amendment."
In reversing the panel, the majority of the en banc court relied
primarily on three United States Supreme Court decisions. 5 The
earliest of these, Burton v. Wilmington ParkingAuthority, involved
a lease of space in a municipal parking garage to a private party for
use as a restaurant. The land and building were publicly owned and
financed, and the building was dedicated to public uses. The lessor
parking authority, an agency of the State of Delaware, had many
obligations to the lessee under the lease. Furthermore, income from
the lease was necessary to make bond financing available, and the
existence of the restaurant may have increased the demand for
parking facilities. The restaurant refused to serve plaintiff solely on
the basis of race, and plaintiff sued for declaratory and injunctive
relief. On those facts, the Supreme Court found the requisite state
action present, stating:
The State has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with [the restaurant] that it must be recognized as a
joint participant in the challenged activity, which, on that account, cannot be considered to have been so "purely private" as
to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2"
In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, plaintiff, a guest at a private
club, was refused service on the basis of his race. He subsequently
brought an action for injunctive relief claiming that because the
State Liquor Board had issued the club a license authorizing the
sale of alcoholic beverages on its premises, the club's refusal of
service to him was state action for purposes of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. A three-judge district court
held that the state granted license was invalid because it violated
the equal protection clause.27 On appeal the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the operation of the state regulatory scheme did
not sufficiently involve the state in the club's discriminatory guest
24. 521 F.2d at 347, 352. It is noteworthy that in the panel decision the court did not
greatly emphasize the effect of these ordinances. The ordinances were discussed at greater
length in Chief Judge Brown's dissent in the noted case. 530 F.2d at 26-31, 33.
25. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).

26. 365 U.S. at 725.
27. Irvis v. Scott, 318 F. Supp. 1246, 1251-52 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
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policies to make the policies state action for fourteenth amendment
purposes." The Court evinced a concern that a finding of state
action, merely because a private entity received any benefit or service from the state or was subject to state regulation in any degree,
would emasculate the distinction between private and state conduct. 9 The Court further explained that nothing in this situation
approached the "symbiotic relationship" between the lessor and
lessee found in Burton and distinguished Burton by stating that
"while Eagle was a public restaurant in a public building, Moose
Lodge is a private social club in a private building."3'
The facts in Jackson v. MetropolitanEdison Co. were different.
In Jackson the right asserted by the complaining party was the right
to procedural due process prior to termination of electric service by
a state regulated utility, not the right to equal protection of the
laws. The Court defined the state action inquiry as "whether there
is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged
action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may
be fairly treated as that of the State itself."3 The Court concluded
that the state was not sufficiently connected with the utility's action
in terminating plaintiff's electric service to make the utility's conduct state action for purposes of the fourteenth amendment. 2
In deciding that the requisite significant state action was not
present in Golden, the court found neither the "symbiotic relationship" present in Burton nor facts sufficient to establish that the city
had "insinuated itself into a position of interdependence" with the
club so that it could be considered a joint participant in the internal
28. 407 U.S. at 177. However, the Court did hold that plaintiff was entitled to a decree
enjoining enforcement of a Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board regulation which required club
licensees to adhere to all provisions of their constitutions and by-laws, insofar as that regulation required compliance by Moose Lodge with racially discriminatory provisions. While the
regulation was neutral in its terms, the Court was of the opinion that in a case where such
provisions required racial discrimination, the result of the rule's application "would be to
invoke the sanctions of the State to enforce a concededly discriminatory private rule." Id. at
179.

29. 407 U.S. at 173.
30. Id. at 175.
31. 419 U.S. at 351, citing Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176 (1972).
32. In Jackson, the plaintiff advanced various theories to support a finding of state
action. Plaintiff argued that state action was present because of the "monopoly status"
conferred upon the utility by the state; because the utility performed a "public function";
because the business was "affected with the public interest"; and because the state had
authorized and approved the termination practice by not disapproving a general tariff, incorporating the practice, filed with the Public Utilities Commission. 419 U.S. at 351-54.
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membership policies of the club.33 The lease was found not to provide "a sufficiently close nexus between the city and the club so that
'
the action of the club may be fairly treated as that of the city."14
The court went on to express its opinion that the district court and
circuit court panel, in finding significant state action, had applied
a "but for" rule,35 and that the Supreme Court had attributed little
6
significance to the "but for" approach in Moose Lodge and Burton."
It is arguable, however, that the relevant Supreme Court
decisions could have been interpreted to reach a different result.
The two Supreme Court cases discussed by the court which appear
to be closest to Golden, factually and in terms of the interests of the
33. 530 F.2d at 22. Due to its emphasis on the lack of a showing that the city had involved
itself in the internal membership policies of the club, 530 F.2d at 20, 22, and because Chief
Judge Coleman had emphasized this point in his dissent in the panel decision, 521 F.2d at
354, the Golden case may be interpreted as requiring state participation in the precise activity
challenged as a prerequisite to a finding of state action. There is some support for this view
of state action in Jackson: "But the inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus
between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the
latter may be fairly treated as that of the state itself." 419 U.S. at 351, citing Moose Lodge
No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176 (1972). This somewhat restrictive view of state action has
been espoused in other cases. New York City Jaycees, Inc. v. United States Jaycees, Inc., 512
F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1975) (sex discrimination); Junior Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. United
States Jaycees, 495 F.2d 883 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1974) (sex discrimination); Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969) (due process); Powe v. Miles, 407
F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968) (freedom of expression). It is submitted that such a restrictive view of
state action is inappropriate in a case involving racial or other class-based discrimination
since it would be a rare situation where a governmental entity would be directly involved in
the decision to discriminate. Such an approach would allow considerable state support to
private discriminatory activity as long as there was no direct involvement in the decision to
discriminate. It is unlikely that the Supreme Court would accept such a state action requirement in the context of racial discrimination. As stated by Justice White concurring in
Gilmore v. City of Montgomery: "[flt is perfectly clear that to violate the Equal Protection
Clause the State itself need not make, advise, or authorize the private decision to discriminate that involves the State in the practice of segregation or would appear to do so in the
minds of ordinary citizens." 417 U.S. 556, 582 (1974).
34. 530 F.2d at 22.
35. The "but for" rule had its origin in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Shelley
dealt with the validity of court enforcement of restrictive covenants which had as their
purpose the exclusion of persons of designated races from ownership or occupancy of real
property. The Court held that in granting judicial enforcement in such cases the states had
is clear
denied the petitioners equal protection. In so holding, the Court stated that "[ilt
that but for the active intervention of the state courts, supported by the full panoply of state
power, petitioners would have been free to occupy the pioperties in question without re-

gtraint." Id. at

19 (emphasis added). The rule in Shelley v. Kraemer has been characterized

as the "minimum involvement" test and has not been widely applied by the courts. See note
14 supra, and sources cited therein.
36. 530 F.2d at 22.
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parties at stake, are Burton and Moose Lodge. State action cases
subsequent to Burton and Moose Lodge have sometimes viewed
these decisions as drawing a "line of demarcation" between situations which do and those which do not involve unconstitutional
state action.37 This approach was also evident in Golden.3" Golden
is factually closer to Moose Lodge in that the discriminating party
was a private club, whereas in Burton it was a public restaurant.
However, Golden more closely resembles Burton in that the state
involvement took the form of a lease rather than a license as in
Moose Lodge.3" Numerous precedents in the Fifth Circuit and elsewhere have based findings of state action upon leases of public
property to private entities. 0 Courts have perhaps been prone to
finding state action based on leases because of a concern that the
37. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974); Fortin v. Darlington Little League, Inc., 514 F.2d 344, 347 (1st Cir. 1975).
38. 530 F.2d at 19, 22.
39. For further discussion concerning the relationship between Golden, Moose Lodge,
and Burton, see 54 TEX. L. REV. 641, 645-48 (1976) noting the panel decision in Golden. There,
in criticizing the panel decision, the author states that while Golden and Burton both involved leases, the resemblance ends there, and concludes "there was nothing in Golden
approaching the economic interdependence present in Burton."
40. Hammond v. University of Tampa, 344 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1965) (lease of city land
and surplus building to discriminatory university); Wimbish v. Pinellas County, 342 F.2d 804
(5th Cir. 1965) (lease of undeveloped county land to private entity for use as a golf course);
City of Greensboro v. Simpkins, 246 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1957) (lease of golf course owned by
city and board of education where federal funds had been used for construction); Derrington
v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924 (1957) (lease of space in
county courthouse for use as a cafeteria); Smith v. City of Birmingham, 226 F. Supp. 838
(N.D. Ala. 1963) (lease of city land for airport motel); Adams v. City of New Orleans, 208 F.
Supp. 427 (E.D. La. 1962), aff'd, 321 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1963) (lease of space in city owned
airport building for use as restaurant); Brooks v. City of Tallahassee, 202 F. Supp. 56 (N.D.
Fla. 1961) (lease of space in city owned airport for restaurant); Jones v. Marva Theatres, Inc.,
180 F. Supp. 49 (D. Md. 1960) (lease of theatre in city hall building to private theatre
operator who discriminated in seating and toilet facilities); Coke v. City of Atlanta, 184 F.
Supp. 579 (N.D. Ga. 1960) (lease of space in city owned airport for restaurant). Contra,
Spencer v. Community Hosp., 393 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (lease of land from state
agency to hospital does not convert private hospital into one acting under color of law);
Solomon v. Miami Woman's Club, 359 F. Supp. 41 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (lease of land to private
club does not make the state a partner in the discrimination); Easterly v. Dempster, 112 F.
Supp. 214 (E.D. Tenn. 1953) (proposed lease of golf course to discriminating private party);
Morris v. Mayor and City Council, 78 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1948) (lease of city building to
teaching institute). But see Mitchell v. Community Hosp., 393 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. Ill.
1975)
(lease of land to private hospital not state action-at least absent a charge of race discrimination).
Itshould be noted, however, that with the exception of Solomon, which found no state
action, none of the cases involved leases to truly private clubs which had not been formed
to evade the requirements of the fourteenth amendment.
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government should not be allowed to accomplish indirectly what it
may not accomplish directly.' Furthermore, the lease-license distinction would seem to have a basis in reason. The Court's holding
in Moose Lodge seems to have resulted, at least in part, from a fear
that a finding of state action based on a regulatory scheme would
destroy the distinction between state and private conduct.42 While
such a fear may be well founded due to the pervasive licensing and
regulation by the state today, it is not at all clear that the leasing
of public property is as pervasive, and therefore that it would substantiate a similar fear. 3
The court also completely ignored the recent Supreme Court
decision in Gilmore v. City of Montgomery." Though not involving
a lease situation, Gilmore dealt with the use of publicly owned
property by discriminatory organizations. The specific issue in
Gilmore involved whether a municipality should be enjoined from
permitting segregated school and non-school groups the use of public park and recreational facilities. The Court held that in permitting private schools and affiliated groups the exclusive use of park
recreational facilities, the city had, in effect, created "enclaves of
segregation" in the context of a 1959 park desegregation order, and
affirmed the district court injunction against such use.45 With regard to the nonexclusive use of public recreational facilities by
private school groups, the Court held that on the record presented
it was unable to determine whether such use involved the govern-

41. Chief Judge Brown expressed this fear in his dissent. 530 F.2d at 32. However, it
should be noted that there was no indication that the City of Miami intended to accomplish
any discrimination, especially in view of the ordinances enacted which prohibited discrimination. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
42. 407 U.S. at 173.
43. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); cf. Gilmore v.
City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974). This fear was, however, expressed by the court in
Magill v. Avonworth Baseball Conference, 516 F.2d 1328, 1334 (3d Cir. 1975), where the court
indicated that if the state action concept included every private use of a public facility, the
concept would be "improvidently expanded" and freedom of activity severely curtailed.
However, there the court was concerned with nonexclusive use of public property. The
situation in Golden involved exclusive use of public property. See Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974), notes 44-54 infra and accompanying text. For further discussion
of Magill see note 54 infra.
44. 417 U.S. 556 (1974).
45. Id. at 569. Justice Blackmun stated in Gilmore that the term "exclusive use" implied
"that an entire facility is exclusively, and completely, in the possession, control, and use of
a private group." Id. at 566.
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ment so directly in the actions of the users that court intervention
on constitutional grounds was warranted. 6 Turning to use by private non-school groups, the Court indicated that the portion of the
district court order prohibiting the mere use of certain facilities by
any private segregated school or club was not predicated on a proper
finding of state action. 7 However, the Court went on to say:
If, however, the city or other governmental entity rations otherwise freely accessible recreational facilities, the case for state
action will naturally be stronger than if the facilities are simply
available to all comers without condition or reservation, Here, for
example, petitioners allege that the city engages in scheduling
softball games for an all-white church league and provides balls,
equipment, fields, and lighting. The city's role in that situation
would be dangerously close to what was found to exist in Burton,
where the city had "elected to place its power, property and
prestige behind the admitted discrimination.""
The Court then remanded the case to the district court for further
consideration.
It is submitted that the Court in Gilmore left open the possibility that the exclusive use of public property by private non-school
groups could be the basis for a finding of state action. Furthermore,
the Court felt Moose Lodge was not fully applicable to the situation
in Gilmore, stating that "[blecause the city makes city property
available for use by private entities, this case is more like Burton
than Moose Lodge."'" Thus, it would appear that the Supreme
Court has recognized a distinction between situations where government involvement takes the form of allowing the use of government
property by a private discriminating entity and situations where the
government involvement takes the form of licensing and regulation.
Therefore, it would appear that Moose Lodge was not controlling in
Golden. 0
46. Id. at 570.
47. Id. at 574.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 573.
50. It should be noted that in Moose Lodge one of the grounds upon which the Court
distinguished Burton was that the Moose Lodge was located on land owned by Moose Lodge
and not by a public authority. 407 U.S. at 175. The Court similarly distinguished Burton in
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. 419 U.S. at 357-58. In both Moose Lodge and Jackson
the Court found state action not present, and on the basis of these cases it appears that
licensing and regulation by the state, without more, will not constitute state action. However,
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Chief Judge Brown, in his dissent, appears to have been of the
opinion that Gilmore required a finding of state action in Golden.',
in situations where the state allows public property to be used by private entities, the precedential value of these cases should perhaps be limited. As stated by the Gilmore Court in
distinguishing Moose Lodge:
In contrast, here, as in Burton, the question of the existence of state action centers
in the extent of the city's involvement in discriminatory actions by private agencies using public facilities, and in whether that involvement makes the city "a
joint participant in the challenged activity, which, on that account, cannot be
considered to have been so 'purely private' as to fall without the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment." [citing Burton .
. .. The question then is whether
there is significant state involvement in the private discrimination alleged.
417 U.S. at 573. Since Golden involved the use of public property by a private entity, the
court should, therefore, have focused on Burton and Gilmore and determined if the city's
involvement was significant within the meaning of those decisions.
51. 530 F.2d at 31.32, Judge Brown also compared Golden to Gilmore by indicating that,
as the city's policies in Gilmore operated to contravene an outstanding desegregation order,
so also the city's lease in Golden, and its refusal to recognize the club's membership policies,
operated to contravene its own antidiscrimination ordinances. 530 F.2d at 32.
In addition to his discussion of Gilmore, Chief Judge Brown discussed at some length
the ordinances enacted by the City of Miami which prohibited both racial and religious
discrimination by lessees of city property, and sponsorship requirements when the lessee is a
private club. 530 F.2d at 26-31, 33. Chief Judge Brown was of the opinion that the ordinances
imposed a burden on both the city and the club to prevent discrimination and that the city's
failure to remove the barrier of discrimination constituted "complicity in the enterprise of
sufficient magnitude to satisfy even the most conservative state action standards." Id. at 3031. There is support in the case law for the Chief Judge's assertion that failure to act on the
part of a municipality may constitute state action. In Jennings v. Patterson, 488 F.2d 436
(5th Cir. 1974), plaintiffs sought to base a finding of state action on the failure of city officials
to remove a barricade placed across a public street by private persons to prevent black
residents from using the street. The court held that the failure of the city and its governing
officials to dismantle the fence constituted the state action proscribed by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Id. at 441. Similarly, in Azar v. Conley, 456 F.2d 1382 (6th Cir. 1972), where plaintiffs had
brought a civil rights action alleging harrassment and intimidation by various defendants,
including police officers, and inaction and cover up on the part of police and other city
officials, the court concluded that "[slection 1983 is applicable in the case of acts of omission
as well as commission." Id. at 1387.
Both Jennings and Azar relied on substantially the same language in Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167 (1961). The issue before the Court in Monroe was "whether Congress, in enacting
[42 U.S.C. § 1983] meant to give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights,
privileges and immunities by an official's abuse of his position." Id. at 172. The pertinent
language in Monroe is as follows:
It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a
federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect,
intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of
citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state agencies.
Id. at 180.
Although not cited by Chief Judge Brown in Golden, there is also dicta in Burton which
is supportive of his position.
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However, his interpretation of Gilmore is perhaps overly broad, as
the Court in Gilmore did not actually hold that unconstitutional
state action would exist where the state allows any discriminatory
private entity the use of public property. 2 Also, in discussing situations where state action may be found through the use of publicly
owned property, the Gilmore Court indicated that aid in addition
to the use of the city property may be required.53 However, it is clear
that Gilmore had a direct bearing on the factual situation in
Golden. In recent decisions, other courts have found it necessary to
consider Gilmore in situations where state action was sought to be
based upon the use of public land by a private discriminating
entity54 and the majority in Golden should have faced and dealt with
As the Chancellor pointed out, in its lease with Eagle [the restaurant] the Authority [the state agency] could have affirmatively required Eagle to discharge
the responsibilities under the Fourteenth Amendment imposed upon the private
enterprise as a consequence of state participation. But no state may effectively
abdicate its responsibilities by either ignoring them or by merely failing to discharge them whatever the motive may be.
365 U.S. at 725.
The majority in Golden, however, dismissed the issue raised by the ordinances on two
grounds. First, the court indicated that there was no cross assignment of error by appellees
which raised any issue of pendant jurisdiction relief. 530 F.2d at 22. Second, the court stated
that nothing was said in the district court "about a failure to enforce the ordinances as
possibly supplying grounds for Fourteenth Amendment relief." Id. at 23.
52. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
53. 417 U.S. at 574.
54. Fortin v. Darlington Little League, 514 F.2d 344 (1st Cir. 1975); Magill v. Avonworth
Baseball Conference, 516 F.2d 1328 (3d Cir. 1975). Both Fortin and Magill involved actions
by young girls, through their parents, against boys' baseball leagues after the girls were
refused permission to participate in the baseball programs. In both cases, plaintiffs urged the
courts to find state action based primarily upon the fact that the leagues conducted their
baseball programs on public property. In Fortin, the district court had found that baseball
diamonds were laid out to league specifications, were primarily for the league's benefit, and
that due to league activities the general public was often precluded from using the facilities.
376 F. Supp. 473, 478 (D.R.I. 1974). The First Circuit, relying on Gilmore, affirmed the lower
court's finding of "significant" state action. 514 F.2d at 347. In Magill, the Third Circuit in
finding no state action distinguished Fortinstating that there was no evidence that diamonds
were laid out to league specifications, that the facilities were primarily for the league's
benefit, or that the general public was often precluded from using the facilities. 516 F.2d at
1334. MagiUl also relied heavily on Gilmore.
It is important that in both cases the courts' approaches indicated that a "government
function" theory of state action was inapplicable. Rather, they focused on whether the state's
involvement was significant. The governmental or "public function" theory of state action
would appear to be applicable only in limited situations where the private entity is exercising
a power, or performing a service, "delegated to it by the State which is traditionally associated with sovereignty." Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974). Based
on these cases it would appear that, despite the deed to the city requiring that the bay bottom

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:198

the Gilmore decision.
In Golden, the court rejected the less stringent test for state
action espoused by some courts in cases involving racial
discrimination.5 The three-judge appellate panel had justified its
acceptance of a less stringent test in cases involving racial discrimination on the ground that "such discrimination was the very condition that precipitated the enactment of the fourteenth amendment." Furthermore, the panel had gone on to extend prior law by
equating religious discrimination with racial discrimination.57 The
panel's conclusion that a less stringent standard should be applied
evoked a strong dissent from Judge Coleman:
But the present majority opinion says that state action is not in
what the state does but is to be determined by who it does it to,
that is, there is one law for a racial or religious complaint and yet
another for the denial of an abortion which the state is constitutionally forbidden to deny. I simply cannot grasp the logic for this
type of judicial picking and choosing. 5
land be used for public purposes, public function analysis would have been neither successful
nor appropriate in Golden. For a brief discussion of state action theories see note 14 supra,
and for a more detailed analysis see the sources cited therein.
55. Weise v. Syracuse University, 522 F.2d 397, 406 (2d Cir. 1975); ',ackson v. Statler
Foundation, 496 F.2d 623, 628 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975); Pitts v. Dep't
of Revenue, 333 F. Supp. 662, 668 (E.D. Wis. 1971); see Ascherman v. Presbyterian Hosp. of
Pac. Medical Center, Inc., 507 F.2d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1974); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73,
81 (2d Cir. 1968); Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382, 1392-94 (N.D. Ind. 1970), aff'd,
445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971) (appellate court found it unnecessary to decide whether state
action cases not involving discrimination require a more demanding standard). See also
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edision Company, 419 U.S. 345, 365 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
56. 521 F.2d at 351.
57. The panel had concluded that "in this context religious discrimination ... carries
the same stigma of inferiority and badge of opprobrium that is characteristic of racial discrimination." Id. The court further indicated that this case involved invidious discrimination
which violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment as well as the establishment and free exercise clauses of the first amendment. Id. at n.18.
58. 521 F.2d at 355. Judge Coleman's reference to the denial of an abortion refers to a
claim asserted in Greco v. Orange Memorial Hosp., 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1000 (1975). In Greco, the hospital had refused to allow nontherapeutic abortions. A
doctor sought declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the
hospital's policy was unconstitutional. The hospital leased both the land and the hospital
building from the county for one dollar per year. County and federal money had been used
to erect the original building and subsequent additions. Furthermore, the hospital was exempt from federal, state, and local taxation. The court in Greco held that there was not
sufficient involvement by the county to justify the imposition of constitutional restrictions.
The panel majority in Golden had distinguished Greco on the ground that the hospital was
not accused of racial discrimination. 521 F.2d at 350-51. The Greco court had distinguished
Burton on the same basis. 513 F.2d at 879-80.
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However, the logic behind this approach to state action was well
expressed by Judge Smith in Weise v. Syracuse University:
As the conduct complained of becomes more offensive, and as the
nature of the dispute becomes more amenable to resolution by a
court, the more appropriate it is to subject the issue to judicial
scrutiny. This explains the willingness to find state action in
racial discrimination cases although the same state-private relationship might not trigger such a finding in a case involving a
different dispute over a different interest. Class-based discrimination is perhaps the practice most fundamentally opposed to the
stuff of which our national heritage is composed, and by far the
most evil form of discrimination has been that based on race. 9
It would appear that Judge Coleman's view has prevailed. The
majority in Golden, after noting that both Burton and Moose Lodge
involved racial discrimination, asserted that the Supreme Court
accepted them as lines of demarcation in Jackson, a nonracial case,
and concluded that whether or not racial discrimination is involved,
"the facts either establish or do not establish significant state involvement in the private activity."60 Thus, the court's decision in
Golden may fairly be read as requiring that future analysis of state
action be limited to the nature and extent of the state involvement
in the private activity, and that regardless of the nature of the
constitutional right allegedly infringed, a single standard be applied. Presumably, this analysis would also preclude focus on the
nature of the challenged party's constitutional rights."' Thus, it is
possible to read the court's opinion as rejecting the balancing of
interests approach to state action.
However, while the Golden majority did not discuss in detail
the interests of the parties at stake, it would appear that their
59. 522 F.2d 397, 406 (2d Cir. 1975). While many cases seem to have acknowledged the
existence of two state action standards, one for cases involving racial discrimination and
another for nonracial cases, it seems possible that further gradations of state action will
evolve in future cases. This possibility was foreshadowed in Weise. There plaintiffs contended
that discrimination on the basis of sex should be categorized with discrimination on the basis
of race for purpose of finding state action. The court stated, however, that "it is not necessary

to put sex discrimination into the same hole as race discrimination to hold that in this case
a less stringent state action standard should be employed .
Id.
60. 530 F.2d at 190.
61. It would be anomalous to refuse to allow the nature of the interest asserted by the
complaining party to influence the state action decision through the use of a different
standard depending on the nature of that right and yet allow the nature of the interest
challenged to militate against a finding of state action.
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relative interests were considered by the court. Judge Brown in the
panel majority opinion indicated "that Courts should minimize the
extent to which they infringe on the individual's First Amendment
right to freedom of association." 2 Also, Judge Coleman, dissenting
in the panel decision, expressed concern as to the effect of the panel
decision upon "the heretofore loudly trumpeted constitutionally
guaranteed rights of privacy and freedom of association.""3 Thus,
the court seems to have recognized that the members of the club
could assert strong associational and privacy interests. "4 On the
other hand, the plaintiffs could clearly assert a strong interest in
being considered for membership without regard to race or religion. "
In a case such as Golden, where the court is faced with "a conflict
between two profound claims of right" 6 and where precedent does
not clearly mandate a finding of state action, it is unlikely that a
decision can or should be made merely on an examination of the
extent of state involvement without considering the nature of the
interests of the parties at stake. To the extent that the court was
influenced by the associational and privacy interests of the club, the
decision may be viewed as a policy decision to protect those interests by preventing federal court intervention in the membership
policies of the club.
Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club presented the court with a
particularly difficult choice. In light of relevant Supreme Court pre62. 521 F.2d at 353.
63. 521 F.2d at 356.
64. It has been suggested, however, that the associational rights of a social organization
may be less compelling than those which may be asserted by other groups, such as religious
or political organizations, because of the primary value placed on religious and political
association by the first amendment. Note, Developing Legal Vistas, supra note 14. However,
social organizations may be able to assert a strong private interest. Therefore, it has further
been suggested that it may be more sensible to consider the right to privacy, rather than
freedom of association, in attempting to measure the limits of racial and religious discrimination. Note, Discriminationin Private Social Clubs: Freedom of Association and Right to
Privacy, 1970 DUKE L.J. 1181, 1211.
65. The strength of the plaintiff's interest in the context of the instant case has been
questioned elsewhere. See 54 TEx. L. REV. 641, 648 noting the panel decision in Golden.
Regarding plaintiffs right to use the docking facilities of a private club, the note states that
it is "[olf minimal importance [not rising] to a level of significance sufficient to invoke
judicial solicitude." Id. at 648. Although other rights may be entitled to greater judicial
concern, it can effectively be argued that whenever discrimination on the basis of race or
religion occurs, arguably supported by the state, the complaining party is able to assert an
important right or interest.
66. See Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of the Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182, 1187
(D. Conn. 1974).
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cedent the issue of the existence or nonexistence of significant state
action was a close one. Furthermore, resolution was made more
difficult in that the underlying policies weighed heavily-the elimination of state supported discrimination," and the protection of
associational and privacy rights are both important goals. 8 While
the court's decision is not necessarily subject to criticism on a policy
level, it is subject to some criticism for not confronting, and distinguishing if possible, a relevant and recent Supreme Court decision. 9
Also, to the extent that concern with the associational and privacy
rights of the club affected the court's decision, the court should have
articulated the impact of these considerations on its decision. Such
a pronouncement would have provided a clear statement that the
court's refusal to act against discriminatory conduct was made in
light of important countervailing interests. This would have avoided
any implication of judicial approval of, or even insensitivity to,
discriminatory conduct. 0
67. Plainly there was some support given by tha lease from the city to the club. As stated
by Mr. Justice White concurring in the judgment in Gilmore:
[TIhere is very plainly state action of some sort involved in the leasing, rental,
or extending the use of scarce city-owned recreational facilities to private schools
or other private groups . . . . For Fourteenth Amendment purposes, the question
is not whether there is state action, but whether the conceded action by the city,

and hence by the State, is such that the State may be deemed to have denied
the equal protection of the laws.

417 U.S. at 582.
68. The particular facts of the instant case, and the nature of the relief sought by
plaintiffs and granted by the district court added a further dimension to the problem. As
stated by the court in Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of the Elks, 382 F. Supp.
1182 (D. Conn. 1974), suits aimed directly at stopping allegedly unconstitutional conduct by
private entities

have appeared to present courts with the bleak alternative of either finding "state
action," with its drastic impact on every aspect of the entitites' operations, or
finding no "state action," thus allowing entities subject to no public accountability for their conduct to continue to receive public assistance so long as that
assistance, however substantial, does not reach the critical mass which transforms
the entity into an agent of the state.
382 F. Supp. at 1190 n.8. Furthermore, while it has been suggested that suits to enjoin state
assistance of private conduct involve a less drastic remedy than suits aimed directly at
enjoining private conduct, Note, Developing Legal Vistas, supra note 14, at 111, and therefore may well succeed upon a lesser showing of state involvement, 382 F. Supp. at 1190 n.8,
it is arguable that on the facts of the present case the cancellation of the lease would have
acted upon private conduct in a more direct way. Without the use of the bay bottom land to
support its docks, the club would not have been able to exist as a yacht club. See 530 F.2d
at 32 (Brown, C.J., dissenting).
69. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974). See notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
70. One commentator has noted that one of the costs of perpetuating private discrimina-
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Golden presents several state action issues worthy of resolution
on a national level. The issue of whether a less stringent state action
standard should be applied in cases involving alleged racial discrimination should be definitively answered and the law in the circuits
made uniform on this point. Also, the question of the impact of any
constitutional right which defendant may assert on the state action
decision should be considered so that courts throughout the country
can focus on only the appropriate factors. Finally, and more specifically, the issue of the nature of state involvement necessary for a
finding of state action in the private club context is worthy of further definition by the Court. Moose Lodge made it clear that licensing and regulation are not sufficient. However, Gilmore indicated
that where the state makes public property available for private use,
Moose Lodge is not entirely apposite. Since similar cases are likely
to arise in the future, further guidance would be desirable. The
Supreme Court has, however, denied certiorari in Golden." It is
submitted that this denial was unfortunate as the opportunity to
make important contributions to state action theory was lost.
Louis B. TODISCO

Time, Inc. v. Firestone: Is Rosenbloom Really
Dead?
The author suggests that the Supreme Court has redefined the
once discarded subject matter analysis for determining the applicability of the constitutionalprivilege in defamation suits and
incorporated it into a new, two-pronged test for determining
whether a defamation plaintiff is a public figure.
Time, a nationally known weekly news magazine, published an
item in its "Milestones"' section informing its readers that Russell
A. Firestone, heir to the tire fortune and wife, Mary Alice Sullivan
tion is the implication of judicial approval of racism. Others include perpetuation of badges
of slavery, the denial of equal opportunity to the excluded class, and lost potential for social
integration. Note, Section 1981 and Private Groups: The Right to Discriminate Versus Freedom from Discrimination, 84 YALE L. J. 1441, 1465-69 (1975).
71. 45 U.S.L.W. 3227 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1976).
1. TIME, Dec. 22, 1967, at 77.

